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The main purpose of this article is to introduce the evidential reasoning approach, a research 
methodology, for decision making under uncertainty. Bayesian framework and Dempster-Shafer 
theory of belief functions are used to model uncertainties in the decision problem. We first 
introduce the basics of the DS theory and then discuss the evidential reasoning approach and 
related concepts. Next, we demonstrate how specific decision models can be developed from the 
basic evidential diagrams under the two frameworks. It is interesting to note that it is quite 
efficient to develop Bayesian models of the decision problems using the evidential reasoning 
approach compared to using the ladder diagram approach as used in the auditing literature. In 
addition, we compare the decision models developed in this paper with similar models developed 
in the literature.   
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The main purpose of this paper is to introduce a general research methodology called 
evidential reasoning for decision making under uncertainty. We use the following two 
frameworks for managing uncertainties in the evidence: Bayesian framework and the framework 
of Dempster-Shafer (DS) Theory of Belief-Functions (Shafer 1976). Evidential reasoning 
basically means reasoning with evidence. Such situations are quite common in the real world 
whether we deal with the medical domain, legal domain, or business domain such as auditing 
and information systems. Srivastava and his co-researchers have applied this approach to 
auditing and information systems domains. They have used this approach to develop models for 
assessing risks such as audit risk, fraud risk, information security risk, information quality risk, 
information assurance risk, auditor independence risk, risks associated with sustainability 
reports, and many others (see. e.g., Srivastava and Shafer 1992; Srivastava and Mock 2010; 
Srivastava, Mock and Turner 2007; Gao, Mock, Srivastava 2010; Sun, Srivastava and Mock 





Srivastava, Mock and Turner 2009a, 2009b; Rao, Srivastava, and Mock 2010; and Mock, Sun, 
Srivastava, and Vasarhelyi 2009). Of particular interest to information systems researchers 
would be the work of Sun et. al (2006) on information security, and of Srivastava and Li (2008) 
on systems security and systems reliability. Recently, Yang, Xu, Xie, and Maddulapalli (2010) 
have used evidential reasoning approach in multiple criteria decisions. 
We first introduce the basics of the DS theory of belief functions in Section 2. We discuss 
the evidential reasoning approach and related concepts in Section 3. We demonstrate how 
specific decision models can be developed from the basic evidential diagrams under the two 
frameworks, Bayesian and DS theory of belief functions, in Sections 4 and 5, respectively.  
Finally, Section 6 provides a conclusion and discusses potential research opportunities. 
2. DEMPSTER-SHAFER THEORY OF BELIEF FUNCTIONS 
Here we briefly introduce the DS theory and illustrate the use of Dempster's rule to 
combine several independent items of evidence pertaining to a variable or objective. The DS 
Theory is based on the work of Dempster during the 1960’s and of Shafer during 1970’s (Shafer 
1976, see also Dempster, Yager, and Liu 2008). There are three basic functions in the DS theory 
that we need to understand for modeling purposes. These are discussed below. 
m-values, Belief Functions and Plausibility Functions 
The basic difference between probability theory and DS theory of belief functions is the 
assignment of uncertainties, the probability mass. In the probability framework, we assign 
uncertainties to each state of nature. These states are assumed to be mutually exclusive and 
collectively exhaustive. The sum of all these uncertainties assigned to individual state of nature 
is one.  For example, consider a variable X. It has two values: “x,” and “~x”. Under the 





the DS theory of belief functions, we assign uncertainties not only to each state of nature, but 
also to all its proper subsets. These assigned uncertainties are called basic belief masses or m-
values and they all add to one. These m-values are also known as the basic probability 
assignment function (Shafer 1976). For the variable X, we can have m(x)  0, m(~x)  0, and 
m({x,~x})  0, such that m(x) + m(~x) + m({x,~x)} = 1. In general, if the variable has n-values, 
then m-values could exist for all the singletons, all the subsets with two elements, three elements, 
and so on, to the entire frame. The entire frame consists of all the elements, i.e., all possible 
values of the variable. 





(x) = 0.6, m
 1
(~x) = 0.1, and m
1
({x, ~x}) = 0.3. These m-values represent a 
mixed piece of evidence; 0.6 level of support that variable X is true; 0.1 level of support that 
variable X is not true; and 0.3 level of support is assigned to the entire frame {x,~x}, 
representing partial ignorance. A positive evidence means that we have only support for ‘x’ and 




(~x) = 0. A negative evidence means we have 
support only for the negation, i.e., m
1
(x) = 0, and 1>m
1
(~x)>0. 
Two other functions are important for our purpose in the current discussion, belief 
functions and plausibility functions. By definition, belief in a subset or a set of elements, say O, 
is equal to the sum of all the m-values for the subsets of elements, say C, that are contained in or 




 . Also, we know 
that Bel(O) + Bel(~O)  1, i.e., belief in O and belief in ~O may not necessarily add to one, 
whereas in probability theory P(O) + P(~O) = 1; i.e., the probability that O is true and the 





evidence, whereas a zero probability means impossibility. Ignorance in probability framework 
simply means assigning equal probability to all the state of nature. For example, if there are only 
two possible values of a variable X, say {x, ~x}, then ignorance means assigning 0.5 to each 
state, i.e., P(x) = 0.5, and P(~x) = 0.5. Under the DS theory, a complete ignorance is represented 
by a belief of zero in “x” and in “~x”, i.e., Bel(x) = 0, and Bel(~x) = 0. 
In addition, we can easily model partial ignorance under DS theory, whereas it is not 
possible to express partial ignorance under probability theory. For example, suppose the auditor 
wants to assess the effectiveness of a security system pertaining to a client’s information system. 
One piece of evidence the auditor could collect would be to review the policies and procedures 
established by the company for the security of the information system. Suppose, based on the 
evaluations of the company’s policies and procedures related the systems security, the auditor 
decides to assign a low level of support, say 0.3 on a scale of 0-1, that the information system is 
secure, represented by ‘x’, and a zero level of support that the system is not secure, represented 
by ‘~x’. This assessment can be expressed in terms of belief masses as: m(x) = 0.3, m(~x) = 0, 
and m({x, ~x}) = 0.7. The value 0.7 assigned to the entire frame {x,~x} represents the partial 
ignorance. However, under probability theory, once you assign 0.3 to the state that x is true, i.e., 
P(x) = 0.3, then by definition the result is P(~x) = 0.7.  There is no way to represent partial 
ignorance under probability theory. 
Consider the earlier example of evidence E
1





(~x) = 0.1, and m
1
({x, ~x}) = 0.3. Based on this evidence alone, we have 0.6 degree of 
support that “x” is true, 0.1 degree of support that “~x” is true, and 0.3 degree of support 









(~x) = 0.1, and Bel
1











Plausibility in a subset, O, is defined to be the sum of all the m-values for the subsets, C, 




 . Also, one can show that Pl(O) = 1 - Bel(~O), i.e., plausibility in O is one 
minus the belief in not O. Using the above example of evidence E
1
, we have m
1
(x) = 0.6, m
1
(~x) 
= 0.1, and m
1
({x, ~x}) = 0.3. Thus, based on the evidence E
1
, we have the plausibility in “x” to 
be 1 1 1 1
x C
Pl (x) = m (C) = m (x) + m ({x,~x})
 







({x,~x}) = 0.1 + 0.3 = 0.4. 
Srivastava and Shafer (1992) tie the plausibility function to the audit risk. More precisely, 
plausibility that an account is materially misstated is the belief function interpretation of the audit 
risk. In the above example, a plausibility of 0.4 that “~x” is true (Pl
1
(~x) = 0.4) can be 
interpreted as the maximum risk that the variable X is not true, based on what we know now 
from evidence E
1
. Using Srivastava and Shafer definition of risk, Srivastava and Li (2008) define 
the systems security risk = Pl(~s) and the systems security reliability = Bel(s), were ‘s’ and ‘~s’, 
respectively, represent that the system is secure and is not secure.  
Dempster's Rule of Combination 
Dempster's rule is used to combine various independent items of evidence bearing on one 
variable. For simplicity let us consider just two items of evidence with the corresponding m-
values represented by m1, and m2. Using the Dempster's rule the combined m-values can be 
written as (Shafer 1976): 
1 2
O = C1 C2
m(O ) = m (C1)m (C2) / K






where K is the renormalization constant and is given by: 1 2
C1 C2 = 
K = 1 m (C1)m (C2)
 
  . The 
second term in K represents the conflict between the two items of evidence. If the conflict term is 
one, i.e., when the two items of evidence exactly contradict each other, then K = 0 and, in such a 
situation, the two items of evidence are not combinable. In other words, Dempster’s rule cannot 
be used when K = 0. One can easily generalize Dempster's rule for n items of evidence (see 
Shafer 1976 for details).  
Let us consider the following sets of m-values based on the two items of evidence 






















(x)]=1-[0.6x0.2+0.1x0.4]= 0.84 and thus the combined m-values are: 
































({x,~x})/K = 0.3x0.4/0.84 = 0.14286. 
Thus, by definition, the belief that “x” is true after considering the two items of evidence 
is Bel’(x) = m’(x) = 0.71428, and the belief that “~x” is true is 0.14286, i.e., Bel’(~x) = m’(~x) = 
0.14286. The plausibility that “~x” is true is 0.28572 (i.e., Pl(~x) = 1Bel(x) = 1 – 0.71428 = 
0.28572). We see here that while belief that X is not true is only 0.14286, the plausibility that it 





3. EVIDENTIAL REASONING APROACH 
As mentioned earlier, evidential reasoning simply means reasoning with evidence. This 
term was coined by SRI International (Lowrance, Garvey, and Strat 1986, fn 1) to denote the 
body of techniques specifically designed for manipulating and reasoning from evidential 
information. Gordon and Shortliffe (1985) discussed this approach under DS theory in the 
context of MYCIN that was being developed “to determine the potential identity of pathogens in 
patients with infections and to assist in the selection of a therapeutic regimen appropriate for 
treating the organisms under consideration (see Shortliffe and Buchanan 1975, p. 237).” Pearl 
(1986) used this approach for analyzing causal models under the Bayesian framework. 
There are two basic dimensions of evidential reasoning. One is the structure of evidence 
pertaining to the problem of interest. The second is the framework used to represent uncertainties 
in the evidence and the related calculus to combine the evidence for decision making. Figure 1, 
represents a simple evidential diagram with three variables X, Y, and Z, represented by rounded 
boxes as variable nodes. These variable nodes may be interrelated through a logical relationship 
such as “AND” or “OR” or an uncertain relationship depicted by the relational node, R in a 
hexagonal box. The rectangular boxes in Figure 1 represent items of evidence, or evidence 
nodes, pertaining to the variables to which they are connected. 
In Figure 1, we have one item of evidence for each variable and one item of evidence 
pertains to both X and Y. This diagram is a network in structure. If we did not have the evidence 
pertaining to both X and Y, then the diagram would be a tree. In general, we may have only 
partial knowledge about these variables because of the nature of evidence; the evidence may not 
be strong enough to provide conclusive evidence about the status of the variables. This partial 
knowledge can be modeled using various frameworks such as fuzzy logic, probability theory or 





uncertainties in the evidence in our illustrations. The question is:  what can we say about one 
variable having partial knowledge of all the variables and their interrelationship in the diagram? 
In reference to Figure 1, what can we say about Z if we have partial knowledge about X, Y, and 
Z, based on the evidence available in the situation as depicted by rectangular boxes in the figure, 
or what can we say about X having the partial knowledge about X, Y, and Z? The partial 
knowledge about these variables comes from the evidence that we may have. 
In order to answer the question “What can we say about Z?”, we need to propagate the 
partial knowledge (uncertainties) about X and Y, through the interrelationship R to variable Z 
and combine this knowledge with what we already know about Z from the evidence at Z. Or to 
answer the question, “What can we say about X having the partial knowledge about X, Y, and 
Z?” basically, we follow the same process. We propagate the partial knowledge (uncertainties) 
from Y and Z through the interrelationship R to X and combine this knowledge with what we 
already know about X through the evidence at X. In order to propagate uncertainties through an 
evidential diagram, we need to understand “vacuous extension,” “marginalization,” and 
constructing a Markov tree
1
 from an evidential diagram. Vacuous extension basically means to 
extend the knowledge about a smaller node (a node consisting of fewer variables) to a bigger 
node consisting of a larger number of variables, without having any new information about 
additional variables in the larger node. The marginalization process is required when the 
knowledge about a node is propagated to a smaller node. This process is just opposite to the 
vacuous extension; one has to marginalize the knowledge from the state space of the node to the 
state space of the smaller node. We illustrate these processes in the following sections. Next, we 
                                                          
1





describe how to construct an evidential diagram and propagate uncertainties through the 
evidential diagram for a problem of interest. There are three main steps: 
Step 1-Develop an evidential diagram for the problem. An evidential diagram is a 
schematic representation of the variables, their interrelationships, and the items of evidence for 
the problem of interest (See Figures 2, see also Sun, Srivastava and Mock. 2006, for more 
details). Figure 2 represents an evidential diagram where one variable, Assertion
2
 A, has four 
items of evidence. In this example, all the variables are assumed to be binary. However, the 
approach being discussed here is valid for multi-valued variables too.  
Step 2-Representation of Uncertainties in Evidence: In this step we represent 
uncertainties in the evidence using the corresponding framework. For example, for Bayesian 
framework we use probabilities and/or conditional probabilities to represent uncertainties in the 
evidence. In DS theory, we use belief masses to represent uncertainties in the evidence. We 
express the uncertainties in the evidence pertaining to various variables and also express the 
uncertainties pertaining to the relationships used in the evidential diagram. In other words, for 
Bayesian framework, we determine the probability information for each variable in the network 
based on the evidence, and express the interrelationships among the variables in terms of 
probabilities. Similarly for DS theory, we determine the belief masses for each variable in the 
network based on the evidence pertaining to the variable, and express the interrelationships 
among the variables in terms of belief masses. 
Step 3: Propagation of Uncertainties in Evidential Diagram: Shenoy and Shafer 
(1990) have developed local computation techniques for propagating uncertainties in a network 
                                                          
2
SAS No. 31 (AICPA 1980) defines management assertions as the “representations by management that are 
embodied in financial statement components.” According to SAS 31, the management assertions consist of 
“Existence or Occurrence,” “Completeness,” “Valuation or Allocation,” “Rights and Obligations,” and “Presentation 
and Disclosure.” AICPA has recently issued SAS No. 106 (AICPA 2006), Audit Evidence, to supersede SAS No. 31, 





of variables, i.e., through the evidential diagram, for both Bayesian framework and DS theory. 
Under the local computation technique for Bayesian framework, the partial knowledge about 
nodes, i.e., variables, is expressed in terms of probabilities and/or conditional probabilities 
known as probability potentials. Under DS theory, this knowledge is expressed in terms of belief 
masses defined at these nodes. 
Under the local computation technique, the propagation of partial knowledge about 
variables in the evidential diagram follows the following techniques:  if the partial knowledge is 
being propagated from a smaller node (fewer variables) to a larger node (more variables) then 
this knowledge needs to be vacuously extended to the state space of the larger node. However, if 
the partial knowledge is propagated from a larger node to a smaller node then this knowledge 
needs to be marginalized onto the state space of the smaller node. We will demonstrate the use of 
these techniques in Section 3 for Bayesian theory and Section 4 for DS theory. It should be noted 
that recent developments in propagating partial knowledge through a network of variables using 
local computations has made it possible to develop computer software such as Netica 
(http://www.norsys.com/) for the Bayesian, and Auditor Assistant (Shafer, Shenoy and 
Srivastava 1988) and TBMLAB (Smets 2005) for DS theory to solve complex problems. Also, 
this development allows one to develop analytical models for complex problems (e.g., see, 
Srivastava, Mock, and Turner 2009, and 2007). 
4. EVIDENTIAL REASONING UNDER BAYESIAN FRAMEWORK  
In this section, we use the Shenoy and Shafer (1990) approach to derive the traditional 
Bayesian audit risk models as derived by Leslie (1984) and Kinney (1984) using a ladder diagram 
approach. The reason we select to derive the traditional Bayesian audit risk model and not a model 





comparison with the ladder diagram approach as used by Leslie (1984) and Kenney (1984) to 
derive the well established Bayesian models. The ladder diagram approach has limited 
applicability, especially if there are several interrelated variables. For example, in developing a 
model for assessing fraud risk under the Bayesian theory (Srivastava, Mock, and Turner 2009), we 
have three fraud triangle variables, Incentives, Attitude, and Opportunities. These variables, in 
general, can be considered to be interrelated. And each variable has multiple items of evidence. 
Such a situation cannot be handled by the ladder diagram approach for developing analytical 
models. Srivastava, Mock, and Turner (2009b) use the evidential reasoning approach to develop a 
fraud risk assessment model under the Bayesian framework and analyze the results by considering 
several scenarios. 
Audit Risk Formula at the Assertion Level 
Figure 2 represents an evidential diagram for financial statement audit of an assertion of 
an account, say, Assertion A, on the balance sheet, depicted by a rectangular box with rounded 
corners. As commonly considered in the auditing literature, we assume that this assertion takes 
two values: “a = yes, the assertion A is true”, and “~a = no, the assertion is not true.” In the 
present case, we have four items of evidence pertaining to this assertion represented by 
rectangular boxes in Figure 2. Evidence E
IF
 represents the evidence based on the inherent factors 
(IF), whether material misstatement is present or not. Evidence E
IC
 represents the evidence based 
on internal controls whether the account balance is materially misstated or not. Similarly, E
AP
 
represents the evidence obtained from analytical procedures (AP) whether the account is 
materially misstated or not, and E
TD
 represents the evidence obtained from performing test of 













), that the assertion is not true given that we have partial 









To derive the Bayesian audit risk formula, we need to first identify all the probability 
information (the partial knowledge) based on the four items of evidence about “Assertion A” and 
then combine them using the Shenoy and Shafer (1990) approach. Probability information on a 
variable is expressed in terms of what Bayesian literature refers to as probability potentials, 
which essentially are probabilities or conditional probabilities associated with the variable based 
on the evidence. The following discussion provides the details of the steps involved in 
identifying and combining all the potentials at the variable and finally determining the posterior 
probabilities.
  
Step 1- Identify all the Probability Potentials in the Evidential Diagram: Based on the 
four items of evidence (see Figure 2), we have the following probability potentials (’s) in terms 
of prior probabilities and conditional probabilities at “Assertion A”. 







φ (a) P (a)
 =   = 
P (~a)φ (~a)
   
   
    
 (1a) 






φ (a) P (E |a)
 =   = 
P (E |~a)φ (~a)
   
   
    
 (1b) 




P (E |a)φ (a)
 =   = 
P (E |~a)φ (~a)
   
    
  
 (1c) 





φ (a) P (E |a)
 =   = 
P (E |~a)φ (~a)
   
   
    
 (1d) 
The above probability potentials are not necessarily normalized because, in general, 





Step 2- Combination of Potentials: According to Shenoy and Shafer (1990), the 
combined probability potentials at “Assertion A” are determined by point-wise multiplication of 
all the potentials at A, which is the process of multiplying each element of the potential by the 
corresponding element of the other potentials at the variable. This process yields the following 
potentials at “Assertion A”. 
 
IF IC AP TD
A IF IC AP TD
IF IC AP TD
P (a)P(E |a)P(E |a)P(E |a)
 = 
P (~a)P(E |~a)P(E |~a)P(E |~a)
 
       
  ,
 (1e) 
where the symbol  represents the point-wise multiplication of the potentials. 
 
If we normalize the above potentials, we obtain the posterior probabilities obtained by 
using Bayes’ Rule, which is given by the following expression: 
IF IC AP TD
IF IC AP TD
IF IC AP TD IF IC AP TD
P (~a)P(E |~a)P(E |~a)P(E |~a)
P(~a|E E E E ) = 
P (~a)P(E |~a)P(E |~a)P(E |~a) + P (a)P(E |a)P(E |a)P(E |a)
. (2) 
In terms of the symbols used by Kinney (1984), we can rewrite the above equation as: 
IF IC AP TD
IC AP TD
IR.CR.APR.DR
P(~a|E E E E ) = AR = 
IR.CR.APR.DR + (1-IR)P(E |a)P(E |a)P(E |a)
. (3) 
Equation (3) is the general result derived by Kinney (1984) using the ladder diagram 
approach. In the above expression, AR represents the traditional Bayesian audit risk and IR, CR, 
APR, and DR, respectively, represent the inherent risk, control risk, analytical procedure risk, 







|a) = 1, because internal controls, analytical 
procedures, and test of details will find no material misstatement if there is no material 
misstatement. However, Kinney (1984) assumed that these conditional probabilities may not 





One can write the audit risk formula in (2) in terms of the likelihood ratios (’s) and prior 
odds (a) as: 
  
IF IC AP TD
a IC AP TD
1
P(~a|E E E E ) = 
1 + π λ λ λ
, (4)
 

























|~a). In general, the 
likelihood ratio represents the strength of the corresponding evidence (Dutta and Srivastava 
1993, 1996, Edwards 1984). A value of >>1 means that the evidence is positive and provides 
support in favor of the variable. A values of 1>≥0 means the evidence is negative and supports 
the negation of the variable. A value of = 1 represents a neutral item of evidence. It simply 
means that there is no information in the evidence about the variable or that we have not 
performed the procedure, i.e., we have not collected the corresponding piece of evidence. An 
infinitely large value of  (i.e., ) means that the evidence in support of the variable is so 





A value of = 0 implies infinitely strong negative item of evidence suggesting that it is 
impossible for the variable to be true. For example, if 
IC
= 0 then P(a|E
IC
) = 0, an P(~a| E
IC
) = 1. 
Equation (4) yields intuitively appealing results. For example, when we have no evidence 
about the variable “Assertion A” whether it is true or not true from any of the four sources, i.e., 
when 
a














) = 0.5, as expected (50-50 
chance of the assertion being true or false when we have no information). In order to get the 
















 in the 





audit planning purposes; depending on how strong the prior information (i.e., 
a
) is and the 
strength of internal controls (i.e., 
IC
), one can plan the nature and extent of the audit procedures 




) from analytical procedures and 
test of details for “Assertion A” to achieve the desired audit risk. 
5. EVIDENTIAL REASONING UNDER DS THEORY 
The objective of this section is to show how evidential reasoning is performed under the 
DS theory. Similar to Bayesian framework, we consider the same example and show how one 
can derive the audit risk models at the assertion level under DS theory. Although we could have 
chosen an example from the information systems domain such as information security (Sun, 
Srivastava and Mock 2006) or systems security and systems reliability (Srivastava and Li 2008), 
but for the convenience of the reader we decided to continue with the derivation of the audit risk 
model at the assertion level and compare the results with Srivastava and Shafer (1992). 
Audit Risk Formula at the Assertion Level 
Srivastava and Shafer (1992) developed the audit risk models at various levels of the 
account (assertion level, account level, and the balance sheet level) under the DS theory. These 
models were developed with the assumption that all the items of evidence were affirmative in 
nature, i.e., the items of evidence in their model provided support only in favor of the variables 
being true, and no support for the negation. Recently, Srivastava and Mock (2010) developed an 
audit risk model under the DS theory for the situation where, in general, all the items of evidence 
were assumed to be mixed, i.e., the evidence provided partial support in favor of the variable and 





We consider the case depicted in Figure 2 with one variable, “Assertion A”, and four 
independent items of evidence, inherent factors (EIF), internal controls (EIC), analytical 
procedures (E
AP
), and test of details (E
TD
).  The following sets of m-values represent the strength 
of evidence pertaining to the four items of evidence in Figure 2: 






({a,~a}),  (10a) 






({a,~a}), (10b)  














We use Dempster’s rule to combine the above four items of evidence. Given that 
“Assertion A” is a binary variable, we use Srivastava (2005, Equations 10-13) and obtain the 
following combined belief masses: 
i i i
i i i;  ; m(a)=1 1 m (a) /K m(~a)=1 1 m (~a) /K m({a,~a})= m ({a,~a})/Kand ( ) ( )      , (11) 
where 
i i i
i i iK= 1 m (a) 1 m (~ a) m ({a,~a})( ) ( )      , and  i{IF, IC, AP, TD}.  
As defined in Section 2, the total beliefs and plausibilities for “a” and “~a” can be 
derived from Equations (11) as: 
i
i
Bel(a)=1 1 m (a) /K( )  , i
i
Bel(~a)=1 1 m (~a) /K( )  , where i{IF, IC, AP, TD} (12a) 
i
i
Pl(a)= 1 m (~a) /K( ) , and i
i
Pl(~a)= 1 m (a) /K( ) , where i{IF, IC, AP, TD}. (12b) 
Using the Srivastava and Shafer (1992) definition of the audit risk as the plausibility, 





Audit Risk = 
i
i
Pl(~a) = 1 m (a) /K( ) , where i{IF, IC, AP, TD}. (13) 
Under the special case when all the items of evidence are assumed to be affirmative, as 








(~a) = 0, 
and m
IF
(a) = 1IR, m
IC
(a) = 1CR, m
AP
(a) = 1APR, m
TD
(a) = 1TD, and m
IF
({a,~a}) = IR, 
m
IC
({a,~a}) = CR, m
AP
({a,~a}) = APR, and m
TD
({a,~a}) = TD, Equation (13) reduces to: 
 Audit Risk at the Assertion Level =AR = IR.CR.APR.TD. (14) 
Equation (14) is what Srivastava and Shafer obtained for the audit risk, AR, at the assertion 
level. Also, Equation (14) is similar to the SAS 47 Audit Risk model (AICPA 1983) , where IR, 
CR, APR, and DR represent, respectively, the inherent risk, control risk, analytical procedures 
risk, and test of detail risk at the assertion level. By definition, IR, CR, APR, and DR represent 
the plausibility of “~a” based on the corresponding evidence, i.e., Pl
IF
(~a) = IR, Pl
IC
(~a) = CR, 
Pl
AP
(~a) = APR, and Pl
TD
(~a) = DR. 
6. CONCLUSION AND POTENTIAL RESEARCH OPPORTUNITIES 
In this paper we have introduced the evidential reasoning approach for decision making 
under uncertainties. We have used two frameworks, Bayesian framework and DS theory of belief 
functions, for modeling uncertainties. A brief introduction to belief functions is also provided. 
We have used evidential reasoning approach to demonstrate the process of deriving analytical 
formulas for the audit risk at the assertion level under the two frameworks. The results are 
compared with similar results obtained by previous researchers. It is interesting to note that the 
evidential reasoning approach makes it easier to develop analytical models for decision making 





In terms of research opportunities, there are lots of interesting problems, both theoretical 
and empirical in nature, especially in information systems domain that one could investigate 
using the evidential reasoning approach. Some examples of such problems are: How effective 
and reliable is the accounting information system of a company? How effective are the internal 
accounting controls in an accounting system? Answers to these questions come down to 
determining the assertions and sub-assertion relevant to the problem of interest, interrelationships 
among these assertions and sub-assertions, and determining the corresponding items of evidence 
to assess whether these assertions are true or not. Essentially, this involves creating the 
appropriate evidential diagram and using the appropriate framework for representing 
uncertainties and then using the evidential reasoning approach to make the decision. Another 
area of interest in information system domain is the assessment of trust, trust for regular business 
transactions, and trust for ecommerce transactions. Again, such a problem involves determining 
the basic assertions of trust, i.e., what are the basic assertions and sub-assertions that constitute 
trust and what kinds of relationships exist between these assertions and sub-assertions, and 
ultimately what is the structure of evidence? Again, such questions involve both theoretical and 
empirical studies.  
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: Evidence from Internal Controls 
E
AP
: Evidence from Analytical Procedures 
E
TD
: Evidence from Test of Details   
E
IF
: Evidence from Inherent Factors 
R 
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Evidence pertaining to X 
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